The troubled 2000 elections and their aftermath will have both immediate and lasting consequences for
democracy and governance in Peru.  It may be premature to speculate about what, precisely, these
longer term consequences will be, but a few general observations may be made about the elections and
their immediate effects which affect the Team's strategic and tactical recommendations to USAID.
First, President Fujimori is likely to remain in power for the next five years. Although opponents have
vowed to mobilize domestic and international opinion to force a new election in which Fujimori would
be barred from candidacy, this seems unlikely given the reluctance of the OAS to challenge Fujimori's
victory, and the extent to which the international community is adapting to the post election status quo.
Nevertheless, the solid popular backing and mandate for 
continuismo
 after the President's victory in
1995 has evaporated.  While a hefty chunk of the electorate still supports Fujimori (indeed, close to a
majority), the support seems softer and less enthusiastic than in 1995.  More importantly, a stronger and
vocal antigovernment contingent has begun to make its presence felt in Peru's largest cities.  Whether
this contingent materializes into an organized opposition or political party over the next several years is
unclear.  Whatever its fate, this newly mobilized sector has succeeded in casting doubt on the legitimacy
of the government's third term.  From a D/G standpoint, this could well be a positive development, since
it puts pressure on the government to begin to enact long delayed reforms in order to head off future
protest.
Second, the government inaugurated on July 28, 2000 will be significantly weaker than that inaugurated
in 1995.  A main reason is the change in the composition of Congress.  Although the Congress is as much
a reflection of the flawed electoral process as the outcome in the presidential vice presidential contest,
few actors have challenged the fact that the President's party (Peru 2000) failed to win a majority of
seats.  Events following the election indicate that the government may have succeeded in cobbling
together a new majority coalition through back room deals between officials and elected or re elected
congressmen from other political groupings.  Even if this is the case, the majority bloc is not likely to be
as solidary as the majority that dominated the 1995 2000 Congress, and thus not as successful in
blocking minority influence in legislative debate and policymaking as it has been over the past five years.
Moreover, the opposition parties that hold a larger share of the seats in the new Congress have more
public support than in 1995 2000    a potentially encouraging development.  A larger and less
fragmented parliamentary minority could make the new Congress a more important forum for public
debate, a source of initiative for reform, and an institution capable of fulfilling its oversight functions.   In
principle, members of government and some Congressional leaders have indicated a willingness to
discuss reforms in existing electoral rules and in the size and structure of Congress.  Their sincerity will
be measured in both legislative process and output: whether lofty declarations translate into policy and
whether policy reflects a process of negotiation and compromise within the Congress and among
branches of government.
Third, the elections have enhanced vulnerability to political instability.  The perception the government
was disposed to commit fraud in the first round of the elections, whether true or not, triggered a national
wave of peaceful mobilizations in Peru's ten largest cities.  While related to the mobilizations that
occurred in their wake, the elections and the controversy surrounding them are symptomatic of
underlying public distrust of institutions. Now that the 2000 elections are a
 fait accompli
,  the issues
underlying the antigovernment protest, many of which are identified elsewhere in this report   the
preponderance of power in the Executive branch of central government, the perceived influence of the
National Intelligence Service, the lack of an autonomous Congress, the corruption in the Judicial branch
  all of these factors will likely continue to fuel discontent that may well manifest itself in violence
directed against the government. While the mobilizations have begun to peter out, as has the early,
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