Regarding the issue of vertical accountability, or the accountability of government to the people and the
accountability upward to bilateral or multilateral partners, the verdict is mixed. Actors in and outside
Peru recognize that the government practices sound macroeconomic management and has gone a long
way toward meeting its external financial obligations (debt repayments), protecting the rights of foreign
investors, and in fighting drug production and trafficking. On the other hand, the government has been
dismissive of international norms of behavior with respect to human rights and democratic institutions.
Many interviewees who were not sympathetic with Fujimori suggested the government has achieved
improvements in some areas, such as in information accessibility (i.e., Congress, regulatory agencies),
and in the delivery of public goods. Between 1994 and 2000, the Support Program for Extreme Poverty,
which includes social support, infrastructure development, and social expenditures nearly tripled.
There is a strong sense that the government has delivered public goods in a way that no preceding
elected governments have done. Few argue the Executive is accountable, however.
Civil Military Relations
Another characteristic of the Fujimori government has been its symbiotic relationship with the Armed
Forces. Analysts who have witnessed civil military relations in Peru over the last ten years characterize
the relationship as a civil military pact brokered in large part by the National Intelligence Service
Alan Garcia (1985 1990) pioneered the strategy of using the SIN to control the Army, but
Fujimori, with the aid of Vladimiro Montesinos, a former army captain who had worked with the SIN
under Garcia, perfected it into an art. Without the backing of a formal party, military support has proved
critical to Fujimori, especially in the early, vulnerable stages of his presidency, when his isolation
prompted fears of a coup. Montesinos served in a key liaison function, helping the President identify and
promote loyal officers or force disloyal officers into retirement. Key institutional reforms also afforded
Fujimori greater latitude with respect to the military.
The pact with the military, which enabled the President to execute his April 5, 1992
, thwart a
coup attempt, and defeat the Shining Path had evolved into symbiosis by 1995. A loyal military
leadership has stood by the President in exchange for protection against prosecution for corruption and
human rights violations. Festering discontent among lower ranking officers against loyalists occasionally
surfaced in acts of insubordination, as in 1993, when an army faction tipped off the media with proof
that the army directed the assassinations of nine students and a teacher at La Cantuta, Lima's primary
teachers' college. Dissenters may also have leaked information about the involvement of high military
command members in drug trafficking corruption, triggering an investigation that yielded more than 100
Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas, Direccion Nacional del Presupuesto P blico.
Programa de Apoyo a la
. February 2000. The Team would like to thank Cuanto, S.A. for generously providing this data.
Enrique Obando, a military analyst suggests that the relationship has passed from symbiosis to submission, in
which Fujimori retains the upper hand. With collaboration from the intelligence services, Fujimori has effectively
de institutionalized the armed forces. Interview with Enrique Obando, February 27, 2000. On Garcia's use of the
SIN to control the military, see Obando, in Crabtree (1998), pp. 196 197.
In 1991, Fujimori scrapped the promotional system based on seniority, and succeeded in getting a law passed
allowing the President to name the military commander in chief and permit the appointee to serve as long as the
President saw fit. The law allowed Fujimori to retire the senior tier of
officers in line for the post
and appoint General Hermosa, a Fujimori loyalist, for seven years. (Noted in an Interview with Obando).
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